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Abstract 
The year 2013 is already the ninth year of implementing fiscal decentralization in the 
Slovak Republic. The aim was to ensure independence as well as responsibility of 
subnational governments and improve the ability to finance their original competences from 
own sources. As decentralization leads to growth of imbalance intergovernmental transfers 
are the instruments used by central government to reduce fiscal disparities and fill the gap 
between the spending needs and fiscal capacity of some local authorities. Tax sharing system 
in Slovakia, is an important tool of horizontal fiscal imbalance equalisation. Despite the title, 
shared taxes play the role of unconditional grants if even they are formally labelled as local 
government own revenues under current legislation. In this paper we examine the allocation 
of personal income tax share as an instrument of regional policy and factors affecting inter-
regional disparities in Slovakia. The paper presents some results of the research project 
VEGA1/0822/11 Redistribution of financial resources in the decentralized fiscal system in 
Slovakia.   
 
Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, horizontal fiscal imbalance, regional growth, Gini 
coefficient, fiscal equalization 
 
Introduction 
 New system of financing of the municipalities and higher territorial units (regional 
government) in Slovakia,  has taken  effect in 2005 following the further devolution of 
responsibilities from central to regional and local levels of govenrment. Its basic principle 
was that the subnational governments would finance their „original" competences from their 
own resources. The principle own sources of revenue are local taxes and non-tax revenue, 
that is why fiscal disparities have arisen due to differences between the revenue base of 
local/regional budgets, especially due to various fiscal capacity. There are also differences in 
the need for local public services, as well as in the cost to provide the same level of certain 
services between subnational governments. These differences are brought about by many 
factors (age and different social structures, populations, different environmental and 
economic conditions, etc. 
Fiscal equalisation has to be primarily aimed at equalisation of region’s possibilities 
to provide comparable level of goods and services regardless of the place where inhabitants 
of the state or EU live, it is not a “charitable contribution from richer to poorer (Buchanan, 
1950, s. 596) and as Buchanan adds (1950, s. 596) “financial equalization is based on a firm 
principle in which it gives the opportunity to regions/states inhabitants with lower income 
possibilities right to obtain financial sources or order to ensure fiscal equality”.   
Intergovernmental transfers are used to reduce fiscal disparities and may be regarded as an 
instrument of regional policy and factors affecting inter-regional disparities. 
Intergovernmental grants and transfers remain an important source of finance for sub-national 
provision of public goods and services. The principal intergovernmental transfer in Slovakia 
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is the share of personal income tax, which is collected by the centre. In this paper we have 
examined the regional dimension of tax sharing and their impact on the development of the 
regions in Slovakia. 
 
Decentralization and fiscal imbalance 
Decentralization often leads to growth of fiscal imbalance because the optimal degree 
of decentralization is generally larger on the spending than on the revenue side. As a result, 
the lower levels of governments do not raise sufficient revenue to match expenditure 
responsibilities. This situation is referred to as vertical fiscal imbalance. The allocation of 
expenditure and revenue assignments in fiscally decentralized countries is also accompanied 
by the emergence of horizontal fiscal imbalances between local government budgets because 
of the different fiscal capacities and expenditure needs.   
The existence of a fiscal gap at the subnational government level arising out of own-
revenue and own-expenditure assignments is the basic rationale for a system of transfers. The 
proper system of intergovernmental transfers can correct inequities and inefficiencies caused 
by decentralization. There are numbers of methods to close the fiscal imbalances of sub-
national governments, some of which also reduce imbalances between jurisdictions (Ahmad, 
1997). In practice, we may distinguish between systems of revenue sharing and 
intergovernmental grants. 
The main mechanism for intergovernmental transfers is grants from central to local 
governments. A variety of unconditional (or general) grant systems are in use to address 
vertical imbalances. Provision of conditional (specific) block grants from the centre to sub- 
national governments aims to financing certain services, such as primary education, social 
services and roads. Equalisation grants are used to address horizontal imbalances between 
local authorities.   
Under the tax sharing arrangement subnational governments are automatically 
attributed a fixed percentage of the yields of certain national tax without any discretion or 
taxing power of subnational authorities.  Moreover, central governments play a dominant role 
in determining the amount of revenue each sub-central unit receives from the shared source. 
It has therefore become common in the academic literature to interpret grants and tax sharing 
as equivalent tools of central fiscal control over sub-central tiers.  We do not intend to discuss 
the differences between the two methods of transfers. Anyway, according to the purpose of 
this paper, it should be mentioned that resources emanating from tax sharing are thought to 
convey more power and autonomy to subnational government than intergovernmental grants. 
Also in a tax sharing system, subnational governments tend to bear more financial risk in 
terms of tax revenue losses or fluctuations than if their revenue was based on grants 
(Blöchliger and Petzold 2009). 
Tax sharing arrangements may differ according to how tax revenue is distributed 
across individual jurisdictions, i.e. whether an individual subnational government share is 
closely related to what it generated on its territory or whether there is some in-built 
redistribution.  
In the first case the revenue share of each sub-national government is strictly related 
to what it generates on its own territory. Tax share allocated to each region is proportional to 
what that region generated on its territory and there no horizontal redistribution or fiscal 
equalisation across regional/local governments. The other arrangement redistributes a fixed 
share of specific tax revenues to subnational governments on the principle of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation, levelling out differences in potential revenue raising capacity and/or needs. 
Fiscal equalisation arrangements are implemented indirectly via a vertical system financed by 
national tax revenues generated at the sub-national level. 
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Decentralization in Slovakia 
Since 1989 the Slovak Republic has carried out a comprehensive reform of public 
administration, on which decentralisation has been a key element.  The final target was to 
have a streamlined government, territorially divided in three layers: (a) State administration, 
with a central organisation and a deconcentrated one; (b) the regional layer; and (c) the local 
authorities. As a result, the Slovak Republic is divided into 8 regions and 2,890 
municipalities (as at Dec. 31, 2012).   Every level (state – region – municipality) has its own 
elected officials, distributed responsibilities and liabilities. The municipalities and regions are 
endowed with rule-making power. Within 2890 municipalities are 138 towns and cities where 
live 55 per cent of population. The vast majority of municipalities are very small, being based 
on village communities. Over two-thirds have a population of fewer than 1,000, and the range 
(in 2006) was from just eight people to 415,589 in the capital, Bratislava. 
The present system of local government in Slovakia was established in 1990, when 
new legislation created a system of primary–level elected municipal bodies with legal 
identities and defined rights. The principle functions devolved to municipal governments 
were urban services, housing and physical infrastructure and utilities, together with some 
cultural, sporting and social services. Most of responsibilities for personal social services 
such as education, social welfare and services stayed with central government together with 
social insurance funds.    
The argument, which has been most frequently used in the discussion concerning 
ongoing decentralisation process, was that higher degree of decentralisation could contribute 
to more efficient provision of services by matching expenditure more closely to local 
priorities and preferences. At the same time another tier—regional self-government-was 
envisioned. The proposed creation of a regional tier of self-government should have 
addressed the problem of large proportion of small municipalities with limited professional 
and financial capacity capabilities to manage some public services as well as the problem of 
services where economies of scale and scope exists and services with catchment area 
exceeding municipal jurisdictions. After the elections in December 2001, the governing 
bodies of the Regions were established and took up their functions. The autonomous regions 
started their activities in 2002.  
Years 2002-2003 brought the next stage of devolution represented by a fundamental 
change of responsibilities. The core was the transfer of more than 400 powers from the state 
administration to municipalities, higher territorial units. The transfer implied not only the 
nominal or formal conveyance of the competences, but also of infrastructures, personnel and 
resources. 
The transfer of executed competence from the public administration bodies to the 
municipalities and regional government was accompanied by a significant devolution of 
expenditure responsibilities from the centre to sub-national governments in the areas of 
education, social services, roads and health care, etc. Matching revenue resources to spending 
responsibilities was one the most crucial issues. 
New system of financing of the municipalities and higher territorial units (regional 
government), has taken  effect in 2005, the substance of which was to determine revenue 
collections of the regional government as well as to strengthen the independence and 
responsibility of local governments in deciding on the use of public funds for efficient sub-
national service delivery.  
Municipalities and regional government are responsible for performing their tasks 
with resources from their own budgets. For carrying out state administration tasks, they do 
acquire funds from the state budget. Assignment of expenditure responsibilities to local and 
regional governments has been also accompanied by the emergence of fiscal imbalances 
between sub-national government budgets. 
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The principal own sources of revenue available to local and regional governments 
since 1993 are local taxes and non-tax revenue. The current legislation provides Slovak 
municipalities with eight separate local taxes, which are employed to generate local revenue. 
Municipalities administer seven local taxes (property tax and six specific local taxes), rates of 
which and whether they are imposed, are discretionary. Local authorities have the power to 
offer concessions or waivers on rates of local taxes. The only local tax applicable on the 
regional level is the Motor Vehicle Tax, which is imposed on vehicles used for commercial 
purposes only. Non-tax revenue includes operating surpluses of public enterprises controlled 
by sub-national governments, fees and charges, sales, fines, property income.   
However, own revenue cover only 30 percent of municipal current expenditure and 
even less than 20 per cent of regional current expenditure.  
From a fiscal federalism perspective the high vertical fiscal imbalance has been 
(partially) resolved by conditional grants as well as mechanism of tax sharing.  
There is a system of intergovernmental specific-purpose grants, to finance specific 
spending programs. These represent around one third of municipal budgets. The main grant is 
for education, allocated on a per pupil basis. Other earmarked transfers are provided for 
public housing, public transport, and social care. 
The principal intergovernmental transfer is the share of personal income tax, which is 
collected by the centre. The legislation has stipulated the share of the aggregated personal 
income tax that was re-distributed from the state to respectively the regional government 
(23.5%) and the municipalities (70.3%). The remaining 6.2 per cent was kept by the state. 
Since 2012 the percentages of yield have been changed in favour of state – 65.4% 
municipalities, 21.9% regions, 12.7% state. The share for each subnational government is 
calculated on the basis of needs and former expenditures of the national government for 
devolved responsibilities. Sub-national government are free to use the revenue allocated, i.e.  
it is the unconditional revenue.   
A share of the national personal income tax is distributed to the local and regional 
governments based on the principle of horizontal fiscal equalisation, levelling out differences 
in potential needs; i.e. the share for each SCG is calculated on the basis of needs and former 
expenditures of the national government for devolved responsibilities. Formulas used for 
calculating the tax re-distribution to a certain region/municipality are driven by population 
and population-related factors such as number of inhabitants, age structure, size, population 
density, etc. 
Tax sharing of the personal income tax has been taken for the decisive equalisation 
component in intergovernmental fiscal relations. It is essential to eliminate vertical fiscal gap 
but it is also supposed to include a horizontal equalisation effect, which is deemed to set off 
the expenditure inequalities. 
There are sharp regional differences across Slovak regions. The eastern regions have a 
much higher incidence of poverty, as economic activity is heavily concentrated in the west, 
particularly around the capital, Bratislava. Disparities are usually measured by regional GDP 
as an indicator of economic performance in a particular territory. GDP per capita can be 
assumed to be a good indicator of revenue raising capacity (Blöchliger et al. 2007, p.26). To 
illustrate regional disparities in table 1 we provide regional GDP and unemployment rate 
indicators in 2010. 
Table 1 Regional GDP and unemployment rate in 2010 
Region 
 
% of regional GDP on 
total  GDP 
regional GDP per  capital  
(in EUR) 
unemployment 
rate  
Region of Bratislava 27,78 29 241 
  
5,4  
Region of Trnava 11,64 13 634 
  
9,4  
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Region of Trenčín 9,77 10 744 
  
7,9  
Region of Nitra 10,79 10 078 13,9 
 
 
Region of Žilina 11,39 10 746 
  
12,5  
Region of Banská     
  Bystrica 8,89 8 974 15,5  
Region of Prešov 8,42 6 861 
  
18,5  
Region of Košice 11,33 9 581 
  
16,9  
TOTAL 100 12 131 100  
Source: Statistical Office of Slovak Republic 
 
In our research through the quantification of inter-regional redistribution of shared tax 
to local and regional government budgets, we have assessed the redistributive effect of tax 
sharing in terms of their impact on reducing the horizontal fiscal imbalance. 
 
Personal income tax redistribution  
As mentioned above a fixed share (93.8%) of personal income tax collected in regions 
was redistributed to subnational governments taking a number of need criteria into account. 
In our research we have looked at the amount of personal income tax collected in different 
regions and the sum of revenue from PIT share distributed to municipal and regional 
government budgets in the respected region.  Some of the results and findings are presented 
in the figures and table below.   
In the table 2 below personal income tax collected in particular region as well as tax- 
shared revenues in municipalities and self-governing regions (summed) are shown. Personal 
income tax collected in comparison with revenues from shared tax differs mostly in the 
region of Bratislava where the coefficient is around 20%. In regions of Trnava, Trenčín, 
Žilina, Nitra, Košice and Banská Bystrica the ratio values range from 112%-168%. However, 
in the region of Prešov collected taxes in the year 2010 achieved value 63.4 million EUR, 
revenues of this region (counted revenues of municipalities and self-governing regions) 
exceeded 203.2 million EUR (the ratio achieved value of 320%). 
Table 2   Personal income tax and tax sharing revenue in regions 
 
Region   2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bratislava 
personal income tax collected 707 031 693 830 989 148 791 473 827 754 231 524 
revenue from tax sharing 173 992 347 211 639 792 200 528 965 164 800 934 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 24,61% 25,47% 25,34% 21,85% 
Trnava 
personal income tax 132 215 394 154 608 147 135 916 888 114 744 469 
 revenue from tax sharing 137 393 480 164 895 519 154 981 107 129 406 745 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 103,92% 106,65% 114,03% 112,78% 
Trenčín 
personal income tax 130 112 382 152 624 159 130 202 900 106 003 796 
revenue from tax sharing 153 949 401 181 935 379 170 189 031 138 857 999 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 118,32% 119,20% 130,71% 130,99% 
Nitra 
personal income tax 113 490 405 136 426 738 122 217 521 101 833 368 
revenue from tax sharing 176 743 004 208 159 079 195 059 475 158 213 533 
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% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 155,73% 152,58% 159,60% 155,37% 
Žilina 
personal income tax 133 892 054 158 598 474 131 554 756 111 919 871 
revenue from tax sharing 189 014 496 226 774 201 218 429 955 182 796 310 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 141,17% 142,99% 166,04% 163,33% 
Banská 
Bystrica 
personal income tax 106 400 658 127 583 780 111 424 285 97 374 988 
revenue from tax sharing 179 834 011 211 461 060 197 549 661 163 262 467 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 169,02% 165,74% 177,29% 167,66% 
Košice 
personal income tax 153 980 685 179 860 340 149 848 903 133 460 236 
revenue from tax sharing 205 528 300 242 935 384 227 420 742 187 973 779 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 133,48% 135,07% 151,77% 140,85% 
Prešov 
personal income tax 82 231 872 101 450 489 84 121 635 63 409 816 
revenue from tax sharing 220 249 187 261 378 364 246 336 352 203 153 855 
% tax sharing revenue on 
personal income tax 267,84% 257,64% 292,83% 320,38% 
TOTAL personal income tax 1 559 355 143 1 842 141 275 1 656 760 715 1 482 978 068 
TOTAL personal income tax sharing 1 436 704 226 1 709 178 778 1 610 495 288 1 328 465 622 
Source: National Tax Office 
 
Tax collection per capita in comparison with revenue from tax sharing in particular 
region calculated per one inhabitant is shown in the figure 1. The highest tax collection per 
inhabitant is in Bratislava region, followed by other regions where the situation is much more 
comparable. The worst situation is in region of Prešov where collected tax per inhabitant was 
only 78 EUR compared with revenue from shared tax more than 250 EUR. The figure shows 
that the redistribution has major effect on „poor“ regions as region of Prešov, followed by 
other regions where the coefficient reflecting the difference between tax collecting and real 
revenue from tax sharing is more than 1 (100%). 
Figure 1   Personal income tax and tax sharing in regions calculated per inhabitant in year 2010 
 
Source: National Tax Office 
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To sum up, the region of Bratislava is the region with the highest rate of urbanisation 
and the lowest unemployment rate together producing the highest regional GDP in Slovakia. 
This region is the main contributor to the fiscal equalization via personal income tax sharing. 
On the other hand the region of Prešov has produced the lowest GDP in comparison with 
other regions; also its GDP per capita has been the lowest. With the highest unemployment 
rate its collected personal income tax was only around one third of the average tax collection 
in all Slovak regions (when we abstract from tax collecting in the region of Bratislava, tax 
collecting in the region of Prešov was around the 60% of the average of all other higher 
territorial units). This region is the main receiver of the system, although all other regions 
belong to this category.  
  
Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in regions 
Revealing the possible relationship between fiscal decentralisation and regional 
growth is an important issue in countries with centralized systems as well as for the countries 
with decentralized.  Authors dealing with this topic have tried to determine the correlation 
between these two variables in different countries (developing, developed or just at particular 
states) and to find out which factors are significant or if there does not exist any relationship 
between these two variables (Table 3). 
Table 3 Relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional growth 
Author/Authors   
The country 
observed  Relationship 
Akai, Sakata (2002, p. 
104) USA 
- „fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth, this 
paper suggests that recent moves toward fiscal decentralization 
by developed countries may stimulate their economic growth“ 
- 95% significance level 
Breuss, Eller (2004, 
p.11) 
21 OECD 
countries 
- „survey showed that there is no unambiguous, automatic, 
relationship between decentralisation and growth“ 
Davoodi, Zou (1997, 
p. 255) 
Developed as 
well as 
developing 
countries 
- „developed countries are on average more decentralized than 
developing countries (33% vs. 20%) and tend to have a higher per 
capita GDP growth rate (2% vs. 1.6%)“ 
- „we find a negative relationship for developing countries and 
the world, and none for developed countries“ 
Jílek (2008, p. 13) Czech republic 
- „transfer revenues of higher territorial units have implicitly 
redistributive character and their influence on the regions is 
asymetric“ 
Shahdani, Komijani, 
Vafa, Fard (2012, p. 
79) Iran 
- “there is a statistically significant direct relationship between 
expenditure decentralization and and growth per capita GDP“ 
„ there is a negative and near significant relationship between 
revenue decentralization and income distribution between over 
2001-2008“  
Siničáková (2010, p. 
899) 
Developing 
countries  
Developed 
countries  
- „non-significant or negative relationship“ 
 
- „statistically significant correlation“ 
Thornton (2006, p. 68) 
19 OECD 
countries 
- “when revenue decentralization is measured by only those own-
revenues over which sub-national governments have full 
discretion, fiscal decentralization does not appear to effect 
economic growth in mid to high income countries” 
Zhang, Zou (1998, p. 
236) China 
- „the negative association between fiscal decentralization and 
provincial economic growth has been found to be consistently 
significant and robust in China“ 
Bodman, Heaton 
a Hodge (2009, p. 7) Australia 
- „the impact of fiscal decentralisation in the Australian context is 
not straightforward, but that there is some support for positive 
effects of Australia’s large vertical fiscal imbalance, 
centralisation of taxation powers and decentralised expenditure 
patterns“ 
European Scientific Journal February 2014 /SPECIAL/ edition vol.1 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
383 
 
Rodrigez-Pose, 
Kroijer (2009, p. 29) 
16 countries of 
middle and east 
Europe  
- „expenditure at, and transfers to, the subnational level have had 
negative correlation with national growth rates in CEE, while 
locally imposed taxation has achieved some mildly positive 
economic benefits over time“ 
Xie, Davoodi, Zou 
(1998, p. 238) USA 
- „we find that the existing spending shares for local and state 
governments are consistent with growth maximization“ 
Source: own work. 
 
When determining the impact of the new system of subnational financing and 
horizontal fiscal equalization on regional development and assessing their effects on regional 
disparities the suitable indicator of regional development measuring has to be found. Despite 
criticism we decided to work with the regional GDP/ regional GDP calculated per capita. The 
Gini index is a measure of inequality among all regions of a given country, the value 1 stands 
for the absolute inequality and the value 0 for absolute equality. We observed the regional 
GDP generated in Slovak regions in 1995- 2010 via Gini coefficient. As shown in Figure 2 a 
considerable change from the year 2005 was registered.  
 Figure 2 Gini coefficient in Slovakia in years 1995-2010 
 
Source: own work 
Despite the value of Gini coefficient has increased after the year 2005, to confirm the 
unambiguously negative effect of the fiscal decentralisation process on the horizontal balance 
many other factors have to be considered (not only the correlation). 
 
Conclusion 
The process of fiscal decentralization could be seen as application of the “firm 
conditions” to the subnational governments, when each local/regional government is 
responsible for the financing of its responsibilities on the one side but it also has enough 
fiscal resources to ensure adequate funding of services.  Setting up the extent of decentralized 
revenues reflecting the extent of decentralized expenditure is a sensitive issue that has to take 
into account demographic, social, geographical and economic conditions of the particular 
region.   The horizontal fiscal equalisation is based on the solidarity principle and tax sharing 
arrangement taking a number of need criteria into account. Measuring interregional 
imbalance by the Gini coefficient showed a visible change since the year 2005 when new 
system of subnational governments has been applied. Anyway, further analysis would be 
needed to examine this relation more thoroughly. 
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